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Abstract. Potential buyers of a product or service tend to first browse
feedback from previous consumers through review platforms. This behav-
ior is modeled by a market of Bayesian consumers with heterogeneous
preferences, who sequentially decide whether to buy an item based on
reviews of previous buyers. While the belief of the item quality in sim-
ple settings is known to converge to its true value, this paper extends
this result to more general cases, besides providing convergence rates.
In practice, the quality of an item may change over time as new com-
petitors can appear in the market or the product/service can undergo
modifications. This paper studies such dynamics with changing points
model and shows that the cost of learning remains low, when expressed
in total utility earned by consumers.
Keywords: Social Learning, Bayesian Estimation, Non-Stationary Environment.
1 Introduction
In our society many forms of learning are not from direct experience, but rather
from observing the behavior of other people who themselves are trying to learn.
In other words, people engage in social learning. For instance, before deciding
whether to buy a product or service, consumers observe the past behavior of pre-
vious consumers and use this observation to make their own decision. Once their
decision is made, this becomes a piece of information for the future consumers.
In the old days, it was common to consider a crowd in a restaurant as a sign that
the food was likely good. Nowadays, there are more sophisticated ways to learn
from previous consumers. After buying a product and experiencing its features,
people often leave reviews on sites such as Amazon, Tripadvisor, Yelp, etc. When
consumers observe only the purchasing behavior of previous consumers, there is
a risk of a cascade of bad decisions: if the first agents make the wro
2 Boursier et al.
the following agents may follow them thinking that what they did was optimal
and herding happens. Interestingly enough, this is not necessarily the effect of
bounded rationality. It can actually be the outcome of a Bayesian equilibrium in
a game with fully rational players. It seems reasonable to conjecture that, if con-
sumers write reviews about the product that they bought, then social learning
will be achieved. This is not always the case, when consumers are heterogeneous
and the reviews that they write depends on the quality of the object but also
on their idiosyncratic attitude toward the product they bought. Also, consumers
might value more recent reviews as they describe more accurately the current
state of the product, whose quality indeed changes over time. Considering a sta-
tionary learning environment is thus a simplification that does not reflect the
true behavior of consumers on review platforms. Withdrawing this assumption
does not affect substantially the outcome of the learning process.
1.1 Main contributions
We consider a model where heterogeneous consumers arrive sequentially to a
monopolistic market and before deciding whether to buy a product of unknown
quality, they observe the binary reviews (like/dislike) of the previous buyers.
Each buyer posts a sincere review that summarizes the experienced quality of
the product and an idiosyncratic attitude to it. Ifrach et al. (2019) introduced
this model in the case where the intrinsic quality of the product is fixed over
time and can assume just two values, and studied conditions for social learning
to be achieved. Building on their results, here we consider a larger set of possible
values for the unknown quality and provide rates of convergence of the posterior
distribution of the quality. For continuous quality spaces, we also provide an
efficient non-Bayesian estimator of the quality.
We then consider a more challenging model where the unknown quality may
vary over time. The criterion that we use in this dynamical setting is the utility
loss that a non-informed consumer incurs with respect to a fully informed con-
sumer, who at every time knows the true quality of the product. We show that,
when the quality can assume only two values, the learning cost is a logarithmic
factor of the changing rate of the quality. The bound for the case of continuous
quality is more intricate. Here, too, we consider a non-Bayesian estimator.
Table 1 below summarizes the proved bounds for all considered settings. In
the analysis we also consider the case of imperfect learners, who are not aware
of the dynamical nature of the quality, and we quantify the loss they incur.
1.2 Related literature
The problem of social learning goes back to Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al.
(1992) who considered models where Bayesian rational agents, who arrive at a
market sequentially, observe the actions of the previous agents, and decide based
on their private signals and the public observations, in equilibrium may herd into
a sequence of bad decisions. In other words, social learning may fail with positive
probability. Smith and Sørensen (2000) showed that this learning failure is due
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Quality space Stationary Utility Loss Tight Upper Bound
{q0, . . . , qK} ✓ O (1) ✓
[q, q¯] ✓ O(√T ) ✓
{L,H} ✗ O (ln(1/η)ηT ) ✓
[q, q¯] ✗ O(η1/4T ) ?
Table 1: Bounds summary. In a non-stationary environment, the quality changes
with probability η at each round, while the utility loss is summed over T rounds.
to the fact that signals are bounded. In the presence of unbounded signals that
can overcome any observed behavior, herding cannot happen.
Different variations of the above model have been considered, where either
agents observe only a subset of the previous agents (see, e.g., C¸elen and Kariv,
2004; Acemoglu et al., 2011; Lobel and Sadler, 2015), or the order in which ac-
tions are taken is not determined by a line, but rather by a lattice (Arieli and Mueller-Frank,
2019b). A general analysis of social learning models can be found in Arieli and Mueller-Frank
(2019a).
A more recent stream of literature deals with models where agents observe
not just the actions of the previous agents, but also their ex-post reaction to the
actions they took. For instance, before buying a product of unknown quality,
consumers read the reviews written by the previous consumers. In particular,
Besbes and Scarsini (2018) dealt with some variation of a model of social learning
in the presence of reviews with heterogeneous consumers. In one case agents
observe the whole history of reviews and can use Bayes rule to compute the
conditional expectation of the unknown quality and learning is achieved. In the
other case they only observe the mean of past reviews. Interestingly, even in this
case, learning is achieved and the speed of convergence is of the same order as in
the previous case. Ifrach et al. (2019) studied a model where the unknown quality
is binary and the reviews are also binary (like or dislike). They considered the
optimal pricing policy and looked at conditions that guarantee social learning. A
non-Bayesian version of the model was considered in Crapis et al. (2017), where
mean-field techniques were adopted to study the learning trajectory.
The speed of convergence in social learning has been considered by Rosenberg and Vieille
(2019) in models where only the actions of the previous agents are observed and
by Acemoglu et al. (2017) when reviews are present. This last paper is the closest
to the spirit of our own paper.
Learning problems in non-stationary environment have been considered, for
instance, by Besbes et al. (2015, 2019) in a context where the function that
is being learned changes smoothly, rather than abruptly as in our model in
Section 4.
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1.3 Organization of the paper
Section 2 introduces the model of social learning from consumer reviews. Sec-
tion 3 studies the stationary setting where the quality is fixed. Sections 3.1
and 3.2 respectively consider discrete and continuous quality spaces, while Sec-
tion 3.3 bridges these two cases. Section 4 introduces the dynamical setting,
where the quality changes over time. Section 4.1 and 4.3 respectively consider
binary and continuous quality spaces. Section 4.2 on the other hand shows that
the knowledge of the dynamical structure is crucial to the consumer utility.
2 Model
A monopolist sells at a price p some product of quality Q ∈ Q ⊂ R to a market
of heterogeneous consumers. In the following, the quality space is assumed to be
compact: Q ⊆ [q, q¯]. At time t = 0, Q is drawn at random according to some
prior pi0 and remains unknown to the consumers. We assume for simplicity that
pi0 is uniform over Q, but our results can naturally be generalized to any prior.
A new consumer arrives at each time t ∈ N∗ with individual random prefer-
ence θt ∈ R. This preference is private information of consumer t. The random
variables θt are i.i.d. with cumulative distribution function Fθ.
Based on the historyHt of past observations and her preference θt, consumer t
decides whether to buy the product. The history Ht is rigorously formalized
below. In case of purchase, she receives the utility ut := Q+θt−p+εt where p is
an exogenously determined price and εt are i.i.d. variations caused by different
factors, e.g., fluctuations in the product quality or imperfect perception of the
quality by the consumer. If the consumer does not buy, she gets ut = 0.
Bayesian myopic rationality is assumed, so consumer t buys the product if
and only if E[ut | Ht] ≥ 0, that is, if and only if θt ≥ p−E[Q | Ht]. The consumer
then reviews the product by giving the feedback Zt = sign (ut). In words, Zt = 0
without purchase, Zt = −1 if the product is bought but disliked (ut < 0) and
Zt = 1 if it is bought and liked. The history is now defined as Ht = (Zs)s<t.
In the following, pit denotes the posterior distribution of Q, given Ht, which
determines the buyer decision. Similarly to Ifrach et al. (2019), we define bk as
the time of the k-th purchase:
b1 = min {t | θt ≥ p− E[Q | Ht]}
and bk+1 = min {t > bk | θt ≥ p− E[Q | Ht]} .
(1)
We conversely define B(t) = max{k | bk < t} the number of purchases before t,
and we introduce the function G intervening in the posterior update defined by
G(z, pi, q) = P[Zt = z | pit = pi,Q = q],
=


∫∞
p−Epi[Q] F¯ε(p− q − x) dFΘ(x) if z = 1,∫∞
p−Epi[Q] Fε(p− q − x) dFΘ(x) if z = −1,
FΘ(p− Epi[Q]) if z = 0.
(2)
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In the following, we also use the notation G(z, pi) = Eq∼pi [G(z, pi, q)]. Note that
the purchase decision only depends on Ht and θt, so that it does not yield any
additional information on the quality. This differentiates this model from the
classical social learning models, where consumers have private signals that are
correlated with the quality. As a consequence, the posterior pit only depends on
(Zbk)bk<t. We also consider the following two mild assumptions in the sequel.
Assumption 1 F¯θ(p− q) > 0, i.e., there is always a fraction of consumers who
buy the product.
Assumption 2 The distribution of ε has a continuous positive density on R.
Assumption 1 avoids situations where the consumers would stop buying when
the quality belief becomes low. Without this assumption, learning might fail
(Acemoglu et al., 2017; Ifrach et al., 2019). Assumption 2 on the other hand is
technical, and although not strictly necessary, it simplifies the exposition.
3 Stationary Environment
This section considers the case of a fixed quality across time. For a binary quality
Q = {L,H}, Ifrach et al. (2019) showed that the posterior almost surely con-
verges to the true quality, while Acemoglu et al. (2017) showed an asymptotic
exponential convergence rate. Besides extending these results to larger quality
spaces, this section aims at showing convergence rates of the posterior. The study
of convergence rates in social learning is a recent concern (Acemoglu et al., 2017;
Rosenberg and Vieille, 2019) despite being central to online learning (Bottou,
1999) and Bayesian estimation (Ghosal et al., 2000). Moreover, convergence rates
are of crucial interest when facing a dynamical quality in Section 4.
Section 3.1 shows an exponential convergence rate for a discrete quality space
while Section 3.2 gives a 1/
√
t rate when it is continuous. Section 3.3 finally
bridges these two results when discretizing Q.
3.1 Discrete Quality
In this section, the space Q is finite, its cardinality denoted by K. As a conse-
quence, the posterior update is obtained using Bayes rule,
pit+1(q) =
G (Zt, pit, q)
G (Zt, pit)
pit(q). (3)
Theorem 1 below gives a convergence rate of the posterior to the true quality.
Similarly to Acemoglu et al. (2017, Theorem 2), it shows an exponential conver-
gence rate. While their result considers a binary quality space {L,H} and an
asymptotic convergence rate, we provide an anytime, but less tight, rate on a
general discrete quality space with similar assumptions1. We focus on anytime
rates as they are highly relevant with a dynamical, evolving quality.
1 Although our Assumption 2 is stronger than their Assumption 1, the proof of The-
orem 1 only requires the conditions given by their Assumption 1. The stronger
conditions of Assumption 2 are used in the continuous case in Section 3.2.
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Theorem 1. For q 6= q′, it holds
E[pit+1(q
′) | Q = q] ≤ 2 exp
(
− tδ
4(q, q′)
6γ2(q, q′)
)
,
where δ(q, q′) := minpi∈P(Q) |G(−1, pi, q)−G(−1, pi, q′)|+ |G(1, pi, q)−G(1, pi, q′)|
and γ(q, q′) := maxpi∈P(Q)
∣∣∣ln( G(−1,pi,q)G(−1,pi,q′))
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ln( G(1,pi,q)G(1,pi,q′))
∣∣∣.
Notice that δ minimizes the total variation between Zt conditioned either on
(pi,Q = q) or (pi,Q = q′). Thanks to Assumption 2, both quantities are positive,
guaranteeing an exponential convergence rate of the posterior.
In the proof below, we shall use the notation KL (µ, ν) for the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between the distributions µ and ν, which is defined as
KL (µ, ν) = Ex∼µ
[
ln
(
µ(x)
ν(x)
)]
.
Proof. Recall the prior is assumed uniform onQ. Equation (3) then gives ln
(
pit+1(q)
pit+1(q′)
)
=∑t
s=1 ln
(
G(Zt,pit,q)
G(Zt,pit,q′)
)
. Define now
Xt = ln
(
G(Zt, pit, q)
G(Zt, pit, q′)
)
−KL(G(·, pit, q), G(·, pit, q′)) . (4)
Notice that E[Xt | Ht, Q = q] = 0 and Xt ∈ [Yt, Yt + γ(q, q′)] almost surely for
some Ht-measurable variable Yt. Azuma-Hoeffding inequality then yields:
P
[
t∑
s=1
Xs ≤ −λ
∣∣∣Q = q
]
≤ exp
(
− 2λ
2
tγ2(q, q′)
)
,
which is equivalent to
P
[
pit+1(q
′)
pit+1(q)
≥ exp
(
λ−
t∑
s=1
KL
(
G(·, pis, q), G(·, pis, q′)
)) ∣∣∣Q = q
]
≤ exp
(
− 2λ
2
tγ2(q, q′)
)
.
By Pinsker inequality, KL (G(·, pis, qk), G(·, pis, qk′ )) ≥ δ2(q, q′)/2, which becomes
P
[
pit+1(q
′) ≥ exp
(
λ− tδ2(q, q′)/2
) ∣∣∣Q = q] ≤ exp(− 2λ2
tγ2(q, q′)
)
.
So this yields
E[pit+1(q
′)|Q = q] ≤ exp
(
λ− tδ
2(q, q′)
2
)
+ P
[
pit+1(q
′) ≥ exp (λ− tδ2(q, q′)/2) ∣∣∣Q = q]
≤ exp
(
λ− tδ
2(q, q′)
2
)
+ exp
(
− 2λ
2
tγ2(q, q′)
)
.
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Let x = tγ2(q, q′)/4 and y = tδ2(q, q′)/2. The choice λ = −x +
√
2xy + x2
equalizes the two terms:
E[pit+1(q
′) | Q = q] ≤ 2 exp(−x− y +
√
x2 + 2xy) ≤ 2 exp
(
− y
2
2(x+ y)
)
.
The second inequality is given by the convex inequality
√
a−√a+ b ≤ − b
2
√
a+b
for a = x2 + 2xy and b = y2. From the definitions of x and y, this yields:
E[pit+1(q
′) | Q = q] ≤ 2 exp
(
− tδ
4(q, q′)
2γ2(q, q′) + 4δ2(q, q′)
)
.
AsG has values in [0, 1], | ln(G(z, pi, q))−ln(G(z, pi, q′))| ≥ |G(z, pi, q)−G(z, pi, q′)|
and so γ(q, q′) ≥ δ(q, q′), which finally yields Theorem 1. 
3.2 Continuous Quality
Now consider the continuous case Q = [q, q¯]. The argument from Section 3.1
cannot be adapted to this case. Instead, we first show the existence of a “good”
non-Bayesian estimator. The posterior will also have similar, if not better, per-
formances as it minimizes the Bayesian risk.
In this section, we use the notation g(t) = O (f(t)) if there exists a positive
constant c, independent of t, such that for all t ∈ N∗, g(t) ≤ cf(t). Note that c
can depend on other problem parameters such as the distributions of ε and θ.
Theorem 2. For Mt = E[Q | Ht], E
[
|Mt −Q|
]
= O (1/√t).
Note that the rate O (1/√t) is the best rate possible even if the reviews
report exactly Q+ εt.
Proof. We first show the existence of a good non-Bayesian estimator. Define for
any m, q ∈ Q:
ψm(q) = φ(m, q) :=
∫∞
p−m F¯ε(p− q − x) dFθ(x)
F¯θ(p−m)
. (5)
which is the probability for a buyer to like a product, given that the posterior
quality ism and the true quality is q. Recall that B(t) is the number of purchases
before consumer t and define L(t) the number of likes before consumer t, i.e.,
L(t) =
∑
s<t 1Zs=1.
Lemma 1. For Mt = E[Q | Ht] and P[q,q¯] the projection on the interval [q, q¯],
E
[(
P[q,q¯] ◦ ψ−1t
(
L(t)/B(t)
)−Q)2
]
= O (1/t) ,
where ψt( · ) := 1B(t)
∑B(t)
k=1 ψMbk ( · ).
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The detailed proof of Lemma 1 is postponed to Appendix A.1. We first pro-
vide a quick sketch of the proof. Because of Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, the
expectation of
(
L(t)
B(t) − ψt(Q)
)2
, for a fixed B(t), scales as O (1/B(t)). Thanks
to Assumption 2, ψ−1t is Lipschitz when composed with the projection on Q.
This gives a O (1/B(t)) bound. Leveraging Assumption 1 then yields Lemma 1
when taking the expectation over B(t).
A property/characterization of the estimated posterior is that it minimizes
the Bayesian mean square error among all Ht-measurable functions. In particu-
lar, it has a smaller error than the estimator given by Lemma 1:
E
[
(Mt −Q)2
]
≤ E
[ (
P[q,q¯] ◦ ψ−1t
(
L(t)/B(t)
)−Q)2 ].
Thanks to Lemma 1, the first term is in O (1/t) and Theorem 2 then follows. 
Remark 1. Lemma 1 gives a non-Bayesian estimator that converges to Q at
rate 1/t in quadratic loss. Using arguments similar to Besbes and Scarsini (2018),
this implies that Mt
a.s.−−→ Q, thanks to a result from Le Cam and Yang (2000).
Theorem 2 yields a different result:Mt converges to Q at a rate 1/
√
t in average.
3.3 Bridging discrete and continuous cases
This section bridges the two previous cases by illustrating how the exponential
convergence rate degrades to a 1/
√
t convergence rate when a continuum is
considered as the limit of discretizations. Assumption 2 implies that for some
positive λ1 and λ2 depending only on Q, Fθ and Fε:
∀q, q′ ∈ Q, λ1|q − q′| ≤ δ(q, q′) ≤ γ(q, q′) ≤ λ2|q − q′|,
where δ and γ here correspond to the definitions given in Theorem 1, which
yields in this case:
E[pit+1(q) | Q = q] ≥ 1−
∑
q′ 6=q
2 exp
(
− tλ
4
1(q − q′)2
6λ22
)
.
Assume, w.l.o.g. and for simplicity, that q = 0: then, if we uniformly discretize
the interval [0, q¯] into K points, the last equation becomes for qk =
k
K−1 q¯:
E[pit+1(qk) | Q = qk] ≥ 1−
∑
k′ 6=k
2 exp
(
− tλ
4
1(k − k′)2q¯2
6K2λ22
)
≥ 1− 4
∞∑
n=1
exp
(
− tλ
4
1nq¯
2
6K2λ22
)
.
The last inequality comes from noting that every n ∈ N∗ appears at most twice
from (k− k′)2 in the previous sum. The limit case of convergence is for K ≈ √t.
Speed of Social Learning from Reviews in Non-Stationary Environments 9
In the continuous case, we can thus discretize Q as a grid of size K. This result
then implies that for K ≈ √t, the posterior after t steps concentrates on a ball
of radius O (1/√t), which is the distance between two points of the grid. This
implies a result similar to Theorem 2.
4 Dynamical Environment
The quality is now considered dynamical, i.e., evolving with time. We consider
a Markovian model, where at each time step, the quality is redrawn according
to the prior with some probability η:
Qt+1 =
{
Qt with probability 1− η,
Xt+1 with probability η,
(6)
where the sequence (Xt)t∈N is i.i.d. with distribution pi0 and Q0 = X0.
Studying the convergence of the posterior is irrelevant, as the quality reg-
ularly changes. Instead, we measure the quality of the posterior variations in
term of the total utility loss
∑T
t=1 E [(Qt + θt − p)+ − ut], also known as “re-
gret”. The first term (Qt+θt−p)+ indeed corresponds to the utility a consumer
would get if she knew the quality Qt, while ut is the utility she actually gets. In
the following, the loss defined as
LT :=
T∑
t=1
E
[∣∣E[Qt | Ht]−Qt∣∣] (7)
is instead used as it is easier to bound and justified by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2.
∑T
t=1 E [(Qt + θt − p)+ − ut] ≤ LT .
A proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Appendix A.2. Moreover, Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 respectively imply in the stationary setting that the cumulative loss
is of order 1 for the discrete case and
√
T for the continuous case.
In this whole section, we use the following notations:
– g(T, η) = O (f(T, η)) if there exists a positive constant c such that for
all T ∈ N∗ and η ∈ (0, 1), g(T, η) ≤ cf(T, η),
– g(T, η) = Ω(f(T, η)) if f(T, η) = O (g(T, η)).
4.1 Binary Quality
In this section, we consider a binary quality space Q = {L,H} = {0, 1} for
simplicity. Recall that the prior is assumed uniform on Q, i.e., pi0(H) = 12 . The
posterior update is then given with G as defined in Equation (2) by:
pit+1(H) = (1 − η)G (Zt, pit, H)
G (Zt, pit)
pit(H) +
η
2
. (8)
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By induction, this leads to the following expression, which showcases how con-
sumers value more recent reviews
pit+1(H) =
(1− η)t
2
t∏
s=1
G (Zs, pis, H)
G (Zs, pis)
+
η
2
t−1∑
s=0
(1 − η)s
t∏
i=t−s+1
G(Zi, pii, H)
G(Zi, pii)
. (9)
This expression is more complex than in the stationary case, leading to a more
intricate proof of error bounds besides taking in consideration changes of quality.
Theorem 3 below claims that the cumulated loss is of order ln(1/η)ηT . Perfect
learners, who could directly observe Qt−1 before taking the decision at time t,
would still suffer a loss ηT/2 as there is a constant uncertainty η/2 about the
next step quality. Theorem 3 thus claims that the cost of learning is just a
logarithmic factor in the dynamical setting.
Theorem 3. LT = O (ln(1/η)ηT ) and if ηT = Ω(1), then LT = Ω (ln(1/η)ηT ).
The proof of Theorem 3 is divided into two parts: first, the upper bound
LT = O (ln(1/η)ηT ) and, second, the lower bound LT = Ω (ln(1/η)ηT ). They
use several intermediate results that are proved in Appendix A.3.
The assumption ηT = Ω(1) guarantees that changes of quality actually have
a non-negligible chance to happen in the considered time window. Without it,
we would be back to the stationary case. In the extreme case ηT ∼ 1, the error is
thus of order ln(T ) against 1 in the stationary setting. This larger loss is actually
the time needed to reverse the posterior belief after a change of quality. Indeed,
assume that the posterior is very close to the true qualityH , i.e., pit(L) ≈ 0; if the
quality suddenly changes to L, it will take a while to have a correct estimation
again, i.e., to get again pit(L) ≈ 1.
Proof of Upper Bound. In order to prove that LT = O (ln(1/η)ηT ), we will
partition N∗ into blocks [tk+1, tk+1] of fixed quality and we show that the error
on each block individually is O (ln(1/η)):
t1 = 0 and tk+1 = max {t > tk|∀s ∈ [tk + 1, t], Qs = Qtk+1} . (10)
Define the stopping time
τk := min
({t ∈ [tk + 1, tk+1]|pit(Qtk+1) ≥ 1/2} ∪ {tk+1}). (11)
This is the first time2 in block k where the posterior of the true quality over-
comes 1/2. The loss of a block is then decomposed as the terms before τk, which
contribute to at most 1 per timestep, and the terms after τk. Lemma 3 bounds
the first part and is proved in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3. For any k, P
[
τk − tk ≥ 2 + 6γ
2
δ4 ln(1/η)
]
≤ η, where δ := δ(L,H)
and γ := γ(L,H) as defined in Theorem 1.
2 It is set as the largest element of the block if such a criterion is never satisfied.
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It can then be shown that past this stopping time, 1pit(Qt) cannot go above 2 in
expectation as claimed by Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. For any k ∈ N∗ and t ∈ [τk, tk+1],
E
[
1
pit(Qt)
∣∣∣ τk, (tn)n
]
≤ 2.
We now bound the error after τk on block k. Assume w.l.o.g. that the quality isH
on this block. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
on a single block leads to
E
[ t−1∏
s=n
G(Zs, pis, L)
G(Zs, pis)
∣∣∣ pin, ∀s ∈ [n0, t−1], Qs = H] ≤ 2/pin(H) exp
(
− (t− n)δ
4
6γ2
)
.
Moreover, Equation (9) can be rewritten starting from n0 ≥ 1:
pit+1(q) = (1−η)t−n0+1pin0(q)
t∏
s=n0
G (Zs, pis, q)
G (Zs, pis)
+
η
2
t−n0∑
s=0
(1−η)s
t∏
i=t−s+1
G(Zi, pii, q)
G(Zi, pii)
.
Define Atτk = {∀s ∈ [τk, τk + t], Qs = H}. Combining these last two equations,
we obtain
E
[
piτk+t(L) | piτk , τk, Atτk
]
≤(1− η)t 2piτk(L)
piτk(H)
exp
(
− tδ
4
6γ2
)
+
η
2
t−1∑
s=0
(1− η)sE
[
2
piτk+t−s(H)
∣∣∣ piτk , τk, Atτk
]
exp
(
− sδ
4
6γ2
)
.
Thanks to Lemma 4, E
[
2
piτk+t−s(H)
∣∣∣ piτk , τk, Atτk] ≤ 4 and 2piτk (L)piτk (H) ≤ 2, so that
E
[
piτk+t(L) | piτk , τk, Atτk
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− tδ
4
6γ2
)
+ 2η
t−1∑
s=0
exp
(
− sδ
4
6γ2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− tδ
4
6γ2
)
+
2η
1− exp
(
− δ46γ2
) . (12)
Finally, the loss incurred during the block k is at most τk−tk+
∑tk+1−tk−1
t=0
(
2 exp
(
− tδ46γ2
)
+
2η
1−exp
(
− δ4
6γ2
)
)
, i.e.,
τk − tk + 2 + 2η(tk+1 − tk)
1− exp
(
− δ46γ2
) .
Lemma 3 yields that E[τk − tk | (tn)n] ≤ 2+ 6γ
2
δ4 ln(1/η)+ η(tk+1− tk). Thus
in expectation, given (tn)n, the loss over the block k is bounded by
2 +
6γ2
δ4
ln(1/η) + η(tk+1 − tk) + 2 + 2η(tk+1 − tk)
1− exp
(
− δ46γ2
) . (13)
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Note then that tk+1 − tk follows a geometric distribution of parameter η/2. In
expectation the number of blocks counted before T is thus O (ηT ) and summing
Equation (13) over all these blocks yields LT = O (ln(1/η)ηT ).
Proof of Lower Bound. The proof of the lower bound is postponed to Ap-
pendix A.3. The idea is that the posterior cannot converge faster than exponen-
tially on a single block. Thus, if the posterior converged in the last block, e.g.,
pit(L) ≈ η in a block of quality H , then it would require a time ln(1/η) before
pit(L) ≥ 1/2 in the new block of quality L, leading to a loss at least ln(1/η).
4.2 Imperfect Learners
This section considers the same setting as Section 4.1 and shows that agnosticism
to the dynamical structure of the problem leads to a considerable utility loss. In
the following, we consider imperfect learners, i.e., consumers that are unaware
of the dynamical structure of the problem. As a consequence, their posterior
distribution piimpt follows the exact same update rule as in the stationary case
given by Equation (3): piimpt+1(q) =
G(Zt,pi
imp
t ,q)
G(Zt,pi
imp
t )
piimpt (q). The error measure is then
for imperfect learners,
LimpT :=
T∑
t=1
E
[
1− piimpt (Qt)
]
.
Theorem 4 below claims that the utility loss for imperfect learners is consider-
able, i.e., of order T . It thus supports the significance of taking into account the
dynamical structure of the problem in the learning process.
Theorem 4. If ηT = Ω(1), then LimpT = Ω(T ).
The proof of Theorem 4 can be found in Appendix A.4 and shares similarities
with the proof of the lower bound in Theorem 3. The posterior of imperfect
learners converges quickly to the true quality. Because of this, after a change of
quality, it takes a long time to reverse this posterior belief.
4.3 Continuous Quality
Now, we consider the continuous quality space Q = [q, q¯] with the dynamical set-
ting given by Equation (6). As in the stationary case, we first expose a satisfying
non-Bayesian estimator, implying similar bounds on the posterior distribution.
Theorem 5. The loss of Bayesian consumers in the dynamical continuous case
is bounded as LT = O
(
η1/4T
)
.
In contrast to the discrete case, determining a lower bound in the continuous
case remains open for the dynamical setting. Note that the total error is of order
at least
√
ηT . Indeed, in the stationary case, no estimator converges faster than
a rate 1/
√
t. As the length of a block is around 1/η, the loss per block is thus
Ω
(
1/
√
η
)
. Thanks to this, a tight bound should be between
√
ηT and η1/4T .
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Proof. In the stationary case, our non-Bayesian estimator comes from the ratio
of observed likes. As highlighted by Equation (9), with a dynamical quality,
recent reviews have a larger weight in the posterior. This leads to the following
adapted discounted estimator for η1 ∈ (0, 1):
αη1(t) := η1
∑B(t)
k=1 (1− η1)B(t)−k1Zbk=1. (14)
We recall that B(t) is the number of purchases before t and bk is the time
corresponding to the k-th purchase as defined in Equation (1). Lemma 5 below
bounds the mean error for the estimator αη1 .
Lemma 5. For η1 =
√
η,
T∑
t=1
√
E
[(
αη1 (t)− ψt,η1(Qt)
)2]
= O
(
η1/4T
)
,
where ψt,η1( · ) := η1
∑B(t)
k=1 (1−η1)B(t)−kψMbk ( · ), with ψ defined by Equation (5).
The proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix A.5. Its main point is to show the
following two inequalities for t ∈ [ti + 1, ti+1]:
E
[(
αη1(t)− η1
B(t)∑
k=1
(1 − η1)B(t)−kψMbk (Qbk)
)2]
= O (η1) ,
E
[(
η1
B(t)∑
k=1
(1− η1)B(t)−k
(
ψMbk (Qbk)− ψMbk (Qt)
))2]
= O
(
η
η + η1
)
.
The first one comes from Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, while the second one holds
because the current block is not counted in the sum on the left hand side.
Similarly to the stationary setting, the error of the Bayesian estimator can be
bounded by the error of the non-Bayesian one since the former is the minimizer
of the quadratic loss among all Ht-measurable functions:
E
[
(Mt −Qt)2
]
≤ E
[(
P[q,q¯] ◦ ψ−1t,η1(αη1 (t))−Qt
)2]
.
Thanks to Assumption 2, P[q,q¯] ◦ψ−1t,η1 is Lipschitz. Theorem 5 then follows using
Lemma 5 and Jensen inequality as in the proof of Theorem 2. 
Lemma 5 uses the non-Bayesian estimator αη1(t) with the parameter η1. Quite
surprisingly,
√
η seems to be the best choice of the parameter η1, despite η
being the natural choice. Figure 1 below confirms this point empirically on a
toy example. The experiment considers a quality space Q = [0, 1], a changing
probability η = 10−4 and gaussian distributions for θ and ε. Computing the
exact posterior Mt is intractable, so we remedy this point by assuming Mt = 1
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all the time. This simplification does not affect the experiments run here as ψt,η1
uses Mt only to normalize by the fraction of buying consumers.
A larger η1 allows to forget faster past reviews and thus gives a better adap-
tation after a quality change. However, a larger η1 also yields a less accurate
estimator in stationary phases.
The choice η2/3 seems to be the best trade-off in Figure 1. The optimal choice
of η1 does not only depend on η but also on other parameters FΘ and Fε. In
the considered experiments, η is thus not small enough to ignore these other
dependencies. Figure 1 yet illustrates the trade-off between small variance and
fast adaptivity when tuning η1.
Fig. 1: Behavior of αη1 for different η1.
Value of η1 η
1/3 η1/2 η2/3 η
Error 6362 3056 2327 5408
(a) Estimation error of αη1 . The error is
∑T
t=1
√
E
[(
αη1(t)− ψt,η1(Qt)
)2]
for T = 105,
where the expectation is estimated by averaging over 2000 instances.
0 2×104 4×104 6×104 8×104 105
t
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
η1 = η
1
2
αη1(t)
ψ¯t,η1(Qt)
0 2×104 4×104 6×104 8×104 105
t
η1 = η
2
3
αη1(t)
ψ¯t,η1(Qt)
0 2×104 4×104 6×104 8×104 105
t
η1 = η
αη1(t)
ψ¯t,η1(Qt)
(b) Tracking of ψ¯t,η1(Qt) by α
η1(t) over a single instance.
5 Conclusions
This work proposes a changing point framework for dynamical qualities in re-
view based markets. Leveraging convergence rates in the stationary setting, re-
gret bounds are proved for both discrete and continuous quality spaces with a
dynamical quality. While the bound is tight in the former case, determining a
tight bound in the continuous setting remains an open problem.
Many other directions also remain open for review based markets with chang-
ing quality. Especially, a slowly drifting quality can instead be considered. We
only focus on the consumer side in this work, but the seller can also adaptively
set the price of the item. What is a good seller strategy in this case? On the
other hand, considering perfect Bayesian consumers might be unrealistic. In re-
ality, consumers have limited computation capacity or can be risk averse, leading
to different behaviors.
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A Additional proofs
This section contains detailed proofs of lemmas or theorems postponed to the
Appendix.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Note that L(t)B(t) =
1
B(t)
∑B(t)
k=1 1Zbk=1
, where 1Zbk=1|Hbk , (B(n))n, Q is a Bernoulli
variable of parameter ψMbk (Q). By Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, we have
P
[(
L(t)
B(t)
− ψt(Q)
)2
≥ λ
∣∣∣ (B(n))n, Q
]
≤ 2e−2λB(t).
From this, we deduce a convergence rate 1/B(t):
E
[(
L(t)
B(t)
− ψt(Q)
)2 ∣∣∣(B(n))n, Q
]
≤
∫ ∞
0
2e−2λB(t)dλ =
1
B(t)
.
Now remark from Assumption 2 that
1. ψm is increasing for any m ∈ Q,
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2. there is some C > 0 such that for any q, q′,m ∈ Q, |ψm(q) − ψm(q′)| ≥
C−1|q − q′|. This is a consequence of the fact that the density of ε is larger
than some positive constant on any bounded interval.
The first point implies that ψt is invertible, while the second implies its
inverse is C-Lipschitz when composed with the projection on [q, q¯]. It follows:
E
[(
P[q,q¯] ◦ ψ−1t
(
L(t)
B(t)
)
−Q
)2 ∣∣∣(B(n))n, Q
]
≤ C
B(t)
.
We now remove the conditioning on the values (B(n))n. Recall that B(t)
stochastically dominates a binomial distribution of parameter (t, δ) for some
positive δ thanks to Assumption 1.
E
[(
P[q,q¯] ◦ ψ−1t
(
L(t)
B(t)
)
−Q
)2 ∣∣∣Q
]
≤ 2C
δt
+ (q¯ − q)P(B(t) ≤ δt/2)
≤ 2C
δt
+ (q¯ − q)e−δt/8.
Chernoff bound is used for the last inequality, which finally yields Lemma 1. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
DefineMt = E[Qt | Ht]. The inequality actually holds for each term individually,
i.e., E[(Qt + θt − p)+ − ut] ≤ E[|Mt −Qt|]. Indeed,
E[(Qt + θt − p)+ − ut] = E[(Qt + θt − p)(1Qt+θt−p≥0 − 1Mt+θt−p≥0)]
= E [(Qt + θt − p)(1Qt+θt−p≥0≥Mt+θt−p − 1Mt+θt−p≥0≥Qt+θt−p)] .
Now by distinguishing the two cases, we have:
(Qt + θt − p)(1Qt+θt−p≥0≥Mt+θt−p − 1Mt+θt−p≥0≥Qt+θt−p)
≤
{
(Qt −Mt) if Qt + θt − p ≥ 0 ≥Mt + θt − p,
(Mt −Qt) if Mt + θt − p ≥ 0 ≥ Qt + θt − p.
(15)
And so this term is always smaller than |Mt −Qt| leading to Lemma 2. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Upper Bound.
Proof (Lemma 3). Assume w.l.o.g. in the following that the considered block k
is of quality H , i.e., Qtk+1 = H . Note that for t ∈ [tk, τk − 1], the posterior
update given by Equation (8) yields:
pit+1(H) ≥ G(Zt, pit, H)
G(Zt, pit)
pit(H) and pit+1(L) ≤ G(Zt, pit, L)
G(Zt, pit)
pit(L). (16)
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It thus comes for t ∈ [tk, τk − 1], that pit+1(L)pit+1(H) ≤ 2η−1
∏t
s=tk+1
G(Zs,pis,L)
G(Zs,pis,H)
as
pitk+1(H) ≥ η2 . It has been shown in the proof of Theorem 1 that
P
[ t∏
s=tk+1
G(Zs, pis, L)
G(Zs, pis, H)
> exp
(
− (t− tk)δ
4
6γ2
) ∣∣∣pitk+1, ∀s ∈ [tk+1, t], Qs = H] ≤ exp
(
− (t− tk)δ
4
6γ2
)
.
For n =
⌈
6γ2
δ4 ln(1/η)
⌉
, the previous inequality rewrites:
P
[
η−1
tk+n∏
s=tk+1
G(Zs, pis, L)
G(Zs, pis, H)
> 1
∣∣∣pitk+1, ∀s ∈ [tk + 1, tk + n], Qs = H] ≤ η.
Note that by definition of τk,
piτk (L)
piτk (H)
≤ 1. This previous concentration inequality
and the direct consequence of Equation (16) imply that P[τk − tk ≥ n+ 1] ≤ η.

Proof (Lemma 4). Consider the block k in the following and assume w.l.o.g. that
the quality is H on it. By definition of G and the posterior update, respectively
given by Equations (2) and (8),
E
[ 1
pit+1(H)
∣∣∣Qt = H, pit] = 1∑
z=−1
G(z, pit, H)f
(
G(z, pit)
G(z, pit, H)pit(H)
)
,
with f(x) = 1η
2+
1−η
x
. Note that f is concave on R+, so by Jensen inequality:
E
[ 1
pit+1(H)
∣∣∣Qt = H, pit] ≤ f
(
1
pit(H)
)
. (17)
Lemma 4 then follows by induction
E
[
1
pit+τk+1
∣∣∣ τk, ∀s ∈ [τk, t+ τk], Qs = H
]
≤ E
[
f
(
1
pit+τk
) ∣∣∣ τk, ∀s ∈ [τk, t+ τk], Qs = H
]
≤ f
(
E
[
1
pit+τk
∣∣∣ τk, ∀s ∈ [τk, t+ τk], Qs = H
])
≤ f(2) = 2.
The first inequality is a direct consequence of Equation (17), the second is Jensen
inequality, while the third one is by induction using that f is increasing. 
Lower Bound. Consider the block k and assume w.l.o.g. that the quality is
H during this block. The loss incurred during blocks k and k + 1 is at least
(τk − tk + τk+1 − tk+1) /2.
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Given the posterior update, pit+1(H) ≤ cpit(H) where c = maxpi G(1,pi,H)G(1,pi,L) > 1.
As a consequence, τk+1 − tk+1 ≥ min
(
− ln(2pitk+1 (L))ln(c) , tk+2 − tk+1
)
. Assume in
the following that tk+2 − tk+1 ≥ − ln(η)ln(c) , so that we actually have τk+1 − tk+1 ≥
− ln(2pitk+1 (L))ln(c) .
We now bound ln(pitk+1(L)) in expectation. By concavity of the logarithm,
E[ln(pitk+1(L)) | (tn)n, τk] ≤ ln
(
E[pitk+1(L) | (tn)n, τk]
)
.
Equation (12) in the proof of the upper bound yields
E[pitk+1(L) | (tn)n, τk] ≤ 2 exp
(
− (tk+1 − τk)δ
4
6γ2
)
+
2η
1− exp
(
− δ46γ2
) .
And so, with tk+2 − tk+1 ≥ − ln(η)ln(c) , we have
E[τk − tk + τk+1 − tk+1|(tn)n, τk] ≥ τk − tk +


− ln
(
2 exp
(
− (tk+1−τk)δ46γ2
)
+ 2η
1−exp
(
− δ4
6γ2
)
)
ln(c)


+
≥ τk − tk
+


− ln
(
2η
1−exp
(
− δ4
6γ2
)
)
− 1−exp
(
− δ4
6γ2
)
η exp
(
− (tk+1−τk)δ46γ2
)
ln(c)


+
.
Where we used that − ln(x+ y) ≥ − ln(x) − y/x.
When looking at the variations of the right hand side with τk, it is mini-
mized either when τk = tk or when the second term is equal to 0, i.e., τk =
6γ2
δ4 ln


−η ln

 2η
1−exp
(
−
δ4
6γ2
)


1−exp
(
− δ4
6γ2
)

+tk+1. Finally this yields when tk+2 − tk+1 ≥ − ln(η)ln(c) :
E[τk − tk + τk+1 − tk+1|(tn)n] ≥ min
( − ln( 2η
1−exp
(
− δ4
6γ2
)
)
− 1−exp
(
− δ4
6γ2
)
η exp
(
− (tk+1−tk)δ46γ2
)
ln(c)
,
6γ2
δ4
ln
(−η ln( 2η
1−exp
(
− δ4
6γ2
)
)
1− exp
(
− δ46γ2
)
)
+ tk+1 − tk
)
.
(18)
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Case ηT ≥ 64. Recall that tk+1 − tk are i.i.d. geometric variables of parameter
η/2. Lemma 6 below provides some concentration bound for the sum of such
variables. Its proof is given at the end of the section.
Lemma 6. Denote by Y (n, p) the sum of n i.i.d. geometric variables of param-
eter p. We have the following concentration bounds on Y (n, p):
1. For k ≤ 1 and kn/p ∈ N, P[Y (n, p) < kn/p] ≤ exp
(
− (1−1/k)2kn1+1/k
)
.
2. For k ≥ 1 and kn/p ∈ N, P[Y (n, p) > kn/p] ≤ exp
(
− (1−1/k)2kn2
)
.
Let α ∈ [ 732 , 14 ] such that αηT ∈ 2N and note that 1tk+1−tk≥x follows a
Bernoulli distribution of parameter (1− η/2)x. We then have the following con-
centration bounds:
P
[
αηT∑
k=1
1tk+1−tk>T
]
≤ exp
(
− (1− 2α)
2ηT
4
)
≤ exp
(
−ηT
16
)
≤ e−4. (19)
P

αηT/2∑
k=1
1t2k+1−t2k≥ 2η1t2k+2−t2k+1≥− ln(η)ln(c)
≤ αηT
4
(1− η/2) 2η− ln(η)ln(c)

 ≤ exp
(
−αηT (1− η/2)
2
η
− ln(η)ln(c)
16
)
.
(20)
The first bound is a direct consequence of Lemma 6 while the second one
is an application of Chernoff bound to Bernoulli variables of parameter (1 −
η/2)
2
η
− ln(η)
ln(c) . In the following, we only consider small η, since otherwise the de-
pendence in η in the lower bound does not matter. Thus assume that η is small
enough so that 2η ≥ − ln(η)ln(c) . The second bound then becomes:
P

αηT/2∑
k=1
1t2k+1−t2k≥ 2η 1t2k+2−t2k+1≥− ln(η)ln(c)
≤ αηT
4
(1− η/2) 4η

 ≤ exp
(
−αηT (1− η/2)
4
η
16
)
.
Now note that for any η ∈ (0, 1), e−3 ≤ (1 − η/2)4/η ≤ e−2, so that the last
inequality implies
P

αηT/2∑
k=1
1t2k+1−t2k≥ 2η1t2k+2−t2k+1≥− ln(η)ln(c)
≤ αηT
4
e−3

 ≤ exp(−αηTe−3
16
)
≤ exp
(
−7e
−3
8
)
.
Now note that e−4+e−
7e−3
8 < 1 so that neither the event in Equation (19) nor
in Equation (20) hold with some constant probability. In that case, Equation (19)
means that the αηT first blocks fully count in the regret. Equation (20) implies
that Equation (18) holds for at least Ω(ηT ) pairs of blocks and for each of
them, the incurred error is at least Ω(ln(1/η)). This finally implies that LT =
Ω(ln(1/η)ηT ).
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Case ηT ≤ 64. Since ηT = Ω(1), we can consider a constant c0 > 0 such that
ηT > c0. In that case, the desired bound can actually be obtained on the two
first blocks only. Assume w.l.o.g. for simplicity that T is a multiple of 4 and that
η is small enough so that T/4 ≥ − ln(η)ln(c) .
P (t1 − t0 ∈ [T/4, T/2] and t2 − t1 ∈ [T/4, T/2]) =
(
(1 − η/2)T/4 − (1 − η/2)T/2
)2
= e
T
2 ln(1−η/2)(1 − e T4 ln(1−η/2))2
≥ e−ηT4 (1− e−ηT16 )2.
With a positive probability depending only on c0, the two first blocks are com-
pleted before T , t1 − t0 ≥ T/4 and t2 − t1 ≥ T/4. Equation (18) then gives that
the loss incurred during the two first blocks is Ω (ln(1/η)). As ηT = O (1) in
this specific case, this still leads to the lower bound LT = Ω (ln(1/η)ηT ). 
Proof (Lemma 6). Note that the probability that the sum of n i.i.d. geometric
variables of parameter p are smaller than kn/p is exactly the probability that
the sum of kn/p i.i.d. Bernoulli variables are larger than n. We can then use
the Chernoff bound on these kn/p Bernoulli variables. The same reasoning also
leads to the second inequality. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
This proof relies on intermediate results given by Lemma 7. Its proof can be
found below.
Lemma 7. For any t ∈ [tk + 1, tk+1],
1. piimpt (Qt) ≤ ct−tkpiimptk (Qt);
2. E [ln(1− pit(Qt)) | (tn)n, pitk ] ≤ ln(2)− (t− tk) δ
4
6γ2 ;
3. P
[
ln(1−piimpt (Qt))−E
[
ln(1− piimpt (Qt)) | (tn)n, pitk
]
≥ λγ√t− tk|(tn)n, pitk
]
≤
exp
(−2λ2);
where c = maxpi,z,q,q′
G(z,pi,q)
G(z,pi,q) , δ = δ(L,H) and γ = γ(L,H) as defined in Theo-
rem 1.
Consider two successive blocks k and k+ 1. We can assume w.l.o.g. that the
quality is H on the block k and L on the block k + 1. Similarly to the proof of
Theorem 3, define τk+1 = min
(
{t ∈ [tk+1 + 1, tk+2]|pit(L) ≥ 1/2} ∪ {tk+2}
)
.
The first point of Lemma 7 implies that τk+1−tk+1 ≥ min
(
tk+2−tk+1, − ln(2)−ln(pitk+1(L))ln(c)
)
.
Moreover, thanks to the second and third points of Lemma 7, with probability
at least 1 − e−2λ2 for some λ > 0, − ln(pitk+1(L)) ≥ (tk+1 − tk) δ
4
6γ2 − ln(2) −
λγ
√
tk+1 − tk. So we can actually bound τk+1 − tk+1 in expectation:
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E[τk+1 − tk+1|(tn)n] ≥(1− e−2λ
2
)
δ4
6γ2 ln(c)
min(tk+2 − tk+1, tk+1 − tk)
− 2 ln(2) + λγ
√
tk+1 − tk
ln(c)
.
(21)
Case ηT ≥ 64. Consider α ∈ [ 732 , 14 ] such that αηT ∈ 2N∗. Recall that tk+1 − tk
are geometric variables of parameter η/2. Similarly to Equations (19) and (20)
in the proof of Theorem 3, we can show
1. P
[∑αηT
k=1 (tk+1 − tk) > T
]
≤ exp
(
− (1−2α)2ηT4
)
;
2. P
[∑αηT/2
k=1 1t2k+1−t2k≥ 2η 1t2k+2−t2k+1≥ 2η ≤
αηT
4 (1− η/2)
4
η
]
≤ exp
(
−αηT (1−η/2)
4
η
16
)
.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, the sum of these two probabilities is
below 1, so that none of these two events can happen with probability Ω(1).
When it is the case, the first point yields that the αηT first blocks totally count
in the loss before T . The second point implies, thanks to Equation (21), that the
total loss is Ω(T ) in this case.
Case ηT < 64. Since ηT = Ω(1), we can consider a constant c0 > 0 such that
ηT > c0. Similarly to the case ηT < 64 in the proof of Theorem 3, we can show
that with a positive probability depending only on c0, the two first blocks are
completed before T and min(t1 − t0, t2 − t1) ≥ T/4. In that case, Equation (21)
yields that the loss incurred during the two first blocks is Ω(T ). 
Proof (Lemma 7).
1) This is a direct consequence of the posterior update given by Equation (3).
2) Jensen inequality gives that
E [ln(1− pit(Qt)) | (tn)n, pitk ] ≤ ln(E [1− pit(Qt) | (tn)n, pitk ]).
Theorem 1 claims that E [1− pit(Qt)|(tn)n, pitk ] ≤ 2 exp
(
−(t− tk) δ46γ2
)
(1−pitk(Qt)),
leading to the second point.
3) Recall that for q 6= Qt ln(piimpt (q)) = ln(piimptk (q)) +
∑t−1
s=tk
ln(G(Zs,pis,q)G(Zs,pis) ) and
that ln(G(Zs,pis,q)G(Zs,pis) ) ∈ [Ys, Ys + γ] for some variable Ys. The third point is then a
direct application of Azuma Hoeffding inequality. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
First fix the quality blocks (tn)n defined by Equation (10). Note that η1
∑B(t)
k=1 (1−
η1)
B(t)−kψMbk (Qbk) is exactly the expectation of α
η1(t) given Ht and (tn)n.
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Azuma-Hoeffding inequality yields
P



αη1(t)− η1 B(t)∑
k=1
(1− η1)B(t)−kψMbk (Qbk)


2
≥ λ
∣∣∣∣(tn)n

 ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2λ
η21
∑B
k=1(t)(1 − η1)2B(t)−2k
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−2λ
(
1− (1− η1)2
)
η21
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−2λ
η1
)
.
The second inequality compares the partial sum with its limit while the third
one uses after simplifications that η1 ≤ 1. Using that E[X ] =
∫
R+
F¯X(λ)dλ for
positive variables then gives
E



αη1(t)− η1 B(t)∑
k=1
(1 − η1)B(t)−kψMbk (Qbk)


2 ∣∣∣∣(tn)n

 ≤ η1. (22)
Using the description in blocks, for t ∈ [ti+1, ti+1], we can relate the expected
value of αη1(t) to ψt,η1(Qt):

η1 B(t)∑
k=1
(1 − η1)B(t)−kψMbk (Qbk)− ψt,η1(Qt)


2
= η21

B(t)∑
k=1
(1− η1)B(t)−k
(
ψMbk (Qbk)− ψMbk (Qt)
)
2
= η21

B(ti+1)∑
k=1
(1− η1)B(t)−k
(
ψMbk (Qbk)− ψMbk (Qt)
)
2
≤ (1 − η1)2B(t)−2B(ti+1). (23)
In the last inequality, we used that ψ has values in [0, 1], besides comparing
the partial sum with (1 − η1)B(t)−B(ti+1)/η1. Note that B(t) − B(ti + 1) is the
number of reviews between consumer ti + 1 and consumer t. It thus dominates
a binomial distribution of parameters (t − ti − 1, c), with c := F¯θ(p − q) > 0,
thanks to Assumption 1. As a consequence, with Bin(t−ti−1, c) being a binomial
distribution of parameters (t− ti − 1, c):
E
[
(1 − η1)2B(t)−2B(ti+1)
∣∣∣(tn)n] ≤ (1 − η1)c(t−ti−1) + P
[
Bin(t− ti + 1, c) ≤ c(t− ti − 1)
2
]
≤ (1 − η1)c(t−ti−1) + exp
(
−c(t− ti − 1)
8
)
.
(24)
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The last inequality is obtained by Chernoff bound. Combining Equations (23)
and (24) then gives for h(t) := max{ti|ti < t},
E



η1 B(t)∑
k=1
(1 − η1)B(t)−kψMbk (Qbk)− ψt,η1(Qt)


2∣∣∣(tn)n

 ≤ (1−η1)c(t−h(t)−1)+exp
(
−c(t− h(t)− 1)
8
)
.
(25)
Note that h(t) = max ({t′ < t|Qt′ 6= Qt} ∪ {0}). By reversing the time, t −
h(t) − 1 is thus the minimum between a geometric variable of parameter η
and t− 1:
E



η1 B(t)∑
k=1
(1 − η1)B(t)−kψMbk (Qbk)− ψt,η1(Qt)


2

 ≤ η ∞∑
k=0
(1− η)k
(
(1− η1)ck + exp
(
−ck
8
))
≤ η
1− (1− η)(1 − η1)c +
η
1− exp (−c/8)
≤ η
η + cη1 − cη1η +
η
1− exp (−c/8) .
(26)
As c ∈ [0, 1], the last inequality uses that (1− η1)c ≤ 1− cη1.
Noting that 2x2 + 2y2 ≥ (x + y)2, we can now use Equations (22) and (26)
to bound the total error on a round:
E
[(
αη1(t)− ψt,η1(Qt)
)2] ≤ 2η1 + 2η
η + cη1 − cη1η +
2η
1− exp (−c/8) .
The error on a single round is of order O
(
η1 +
η
η+cη1
)
in average; and for η1 =√
η, it is then O (√η) in average3. Summing the square root of this term over
all rounds finally yields to Lemma 5.
3 Taking η1 =
√
η/c actually is a better choice, but we just focus on the dependence
with η here.
